Civil Protection: The Frontline Against Russian Aggression

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the image of conventional warfare as tanks, missiles, and drones. Yet, for much of Europe, including the UK, the more immediate threat is not massed battalions on our borders, but the insidious “grey zone” of activity that sits below the threshold of open war. Here, civil protection is not a supporting actor: it is the frontline.

Grey zone tactics, disinformation, cyber disruption, sabotage, and the deliberate exploitation of vulnerabilities created by emergencies, are designed to weaken societies from within. Their aim is simple: to create division, distrust, and disarray. Unlike conventional attacks, these methods often bypass armies altogether, striking instead at the cohesion and resilience of civil society.

Recent years have shown us how fragile that cohesion can be. Floods, wildfires, pandemics, cost-of-living pressures, and energy shocks each create spaces where misinformation can spread, where communities feel abandoned, and where public confidence in institutions is tested. It is precisely these moments of strain that Russia and other hostile actors seek to manipulate, whether through online campaigns that inflame social tensions, through probing of critical infrastructure, or through fostering conspiracy narratives that undermine emergency response.

NATO, as a military alliance, is formidable. Its collective defence posture remains robust, deterring direct armed aggression. But we must ask a harder question: is civil society equally prepared? If NATO represents the shield, is our civilian sphere the soft underbelly? The answer depends on whether we treat civil protection as a strategic necessity or a secondary concern.

Civil protection is the connective tissue of national resilience. It is local authorities, emergency services, voluntary organisations, and communities themselves who absorb the first shock of crises. If that tissue is thin or frayed, grey zone activities can deepen the wound. Conversely, a society that can withstand disinformation, maintain critical functions during disruption, and recover swiftly from shocks is far harder to destabilise.

For the UK and our allies, this means investing in the basics of resilience: robust emergency planning, clear risk communication, trusted local leadership, strong voluntary sector networks, and rapid information assurance. It also means seeing civil protection as part of deterrence. An adversary calculating whether to sow chaos must see not only a strong NATO response to overt aggression, but also a society capable of riding out and resisting covert attacks.

Why this matters now

• Grey zone attacks are escalating: hostile actors have already targeted critical infrastructure, seeded false narratives during crises, and sought to exploit energy shocks and pandemics.

• Civil protection is the first line of defence: local authorities, emergency services, voluntary organisations, and communities absorb the first impact of disruption.

• Weakness here undermines deterrence: adversaries calculate not only NATO’s military strength but also whether societies can be destabilised from within.

  
  

What must change

1. Treat civil protection as national securityResilience must move from being a domestic afterthought to being recognised as a core element of deterrence alongside military capability.

2. Plan for hostile state disruption in emergenciesCivil Contingencies exercises should explicitly test scenarios where disinformation, cyber-attacks, or sabotage compound natural hazards.

3. Strengthen trusted communicationPublic trust is a strategic asset. Civil protection agencies must be resourced to counter misinformation swiftly and credibly during crises.

4. Harden critical infrastructure and interdependenciesPower, water, communications, and transport resilience must be stress-tested against deliberate interference, not only natural failure.

5. Invest in voluntary and community networksLocal resilience is the true force multiplier. Community capacity cannot be easily disrupted by hostile actors and should be treated as part of our deterrence posture.

   
   

The strategic choice

If civil protection is seen as secondary, the UK and its allies remain exposed, militarily strong, but socially fragile. If civil protection is elevated to the frontline, we signal to adversaries that grey zone tactics will fail to destabilise us.

The challenge, then, is not only to ask whether our armed forces are ready, but whether our communities are resilient enough to face the forms of aggression most likely to reach them. Civil protection is no longer a domestic backstop, it is Europe’s frontline.